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THE EFFECTS OF PRICE REGULTION ON PHARMACEUTICAL R&D AND INNOVATION 
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ABSTRACT 
As nsrng health care expenditures focus government 
attention on slowing the growth, the pharmaceutical industry 
comes under increasing pressure to curb prices of ethical 
drugs. Pharmaceutical price regulations have been 
implemented in many countries to control pharmaceutical 
expenditures. Yet, creating innovative drugs requires 
enormous R&D costs, which in turn require adequate 
expected economic returns. Since price controls reduce 
profits and expected returns, as countries invoke stricter price 
regulations, firms will either move their R&D process into 
less regulated markets or move out of innovative R&D. This 
paper assesses the impact of drug price regulations in Japan 
compared to market-priced drugs in the US on 
pharmaceutical innovation. 
INTRODUCTION 
In the past few decades, hundreds of innovative new drugs 
have entered the marketplace. They help: improve quality of 
life; save millions of lives; increase labor productivity 
leading to more robust economies; and, provide cheaper, less 
invasive solutions to chronic diseases, such as heart disease. 
The improvements to quality oflife and life expectancy have 
been significant. Studying US life expectancy between 1970 
and 1991 , Lichtenberg ( 1998) conservatively estimates a $15 
billion increase in pharmaceutical R&D expenditures saves 
1.6 million life-years per year, valued at $27 billion. 
Lichtenberg also frnds pharmaceutical innovation decreases 
costs in other areas within the healthcare industry. For 
example, Lichtenberg ( 1996) estimates for every $1 increase 
in spending on pharmaceuticals there is a subsequent 
decrease of $3.65 in hospitalization costs, yielding a savings 
of $2.65 . Additionally, by reducing the age of utilized drugs 
from 15 to 5.5 years, pharmaceutical expenditures increase 
$18, but yield a $129 savings in non-drug expenditures for a 
net savings of $111 (Lichtenberg 2002). 
The worldwide pharmaceutical industry, as we know it today, 
is relatively young, having only become global in the last 
twenty years. Yet over a century of work by chiefly national 
pharmaceutical industries has enabled the industry to 
blossom globally. The countries leading the pharmaceutical 
industry into the global era laid the path to success through 
their domestic policies prior to globalization. Their 
intellectual property rights and domestic market 
environments, often coupled with public research funding, 
enabled innovative pharmaceutical firms to prosper. From 
1820 to 1990 these originator countries of the today's global 
industry created the overwhelming supply of new drug 
technologies. Between 1820 and 1990, 80% of globally 
marketed, innovative drugs for the world's seven leading 
indications came from just five countries: France, Germany, 
Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States 
(Landau et al 1999). The five next most productive countries 
(Belgium, Denmark, Italy, the Netherlands, and Sweden) 
represented 19% of globally launched products, leaving only 
1 % coming from the rest of the world (Landau et al 1999). 
The quantity of new products introduced per country is just 
one measure of innovation. Another is the dollar value of a 
country's pharmaceutical exports, since this figure highlights 
reaching out to a global market. While the countries noted 
above excel in exporting innovative drugs, the Japanese did 
not from 1820 to present. From 1820-1990, about 60 percent 
of the drugs in the Japanese market were only marketed 
domestically and the value of Japanese exports was relatively 
low (Landau et al 1999). Despite some improvement in 
exports, by 2000 Japanese drug exports still ranked eleventh 
in the OECD with exports of $2. 73 billion compared to 
$13.13 billion for the US (JPMA 2003). Japanese drug 
exports to date have brought relatively little value to the 
global market, contrary to Japan's various world-class 
industries. 
Patent protection in the Japanese market has lagged 
compared to that in other developed countries: Only 
processes, not compounds, were protected until 1976. 
Therefore Japanese firms could launch a product that was 
still under patent protection in other countries so long as they 
produced it through a different process. Thus, much of the 
research conducted in Japan prior to 1975 centered on the 
"adapting" of internationally developed products and not the 
development of novel products (Reich 1990). Fearing a 
disadvantage in innovative R&D, in 1987 the Japanese 
government began to direct funds toward innovative R&D. 
Much of this effort, however, was countered by the dramatic 
cuts in the government's national drug reimbursement prices 
(Reich, 1990). Prices were cut an average of 61.4% in the 
1980's, dampening innovator's expected returns (Reich 
1990). 
Today, despite the fact that Japan is the second largest single 
market, its pharmaceutical industry continues to lag behind 
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the United States and Europe in terms of innovation. The 
Japanese market remains centered on domestic products, and 
the few successful Japanese R&D-based firms are 
increasingly concentrated in international markets. 
Companies like Takeda, Daiichi, and Sankyo continue to set 
up headquarters in many more innovation friendly markets, 
as Japan maintains Jess innovator friendly policies. 
In contrast, Europe led the world in drug exports through the 
late 1980s and early 1990s, reflecting the market 
environment in which the industry developed (Landau, 
Achilladelis, and Scriabine 1999). A leading factor for this 
European predominance was early patent protection, 
encouraging R&D leading to innovation. The creation of 
new drugs coupled with strong, historical distribution chains 
enabled the European pharmaceutical firms to flourish. 
The same link to patent protection and innovation holds true 
for the US where it is even more apparent in the 
biopharmaceutical arena. Currently, the US is benefiting 
greatly in the biopbarmaceutical market because it bas long 
been providing protection to both natural products (since 
1947) and recombinant DNA (since 1985) (Achilladelis 
1999). Biological research was initially conducted by private 
firms, qot by the major publicly-held pharmaceutical 
companies. With the assurance of patent protection investors 
moved into the budding biologics industry, as other industries 
struggled (Achilladelis 1999). As the biologics industry 
began to move into pharmaceuticals in the 1980s, many 
European countries did not allow the genetic research needed 
to produce new biologic entities. Thus, both technological 
and intellectual capital moved to the US where they were 
able to pursue innovation (Scriabine 1999). Today the US 
continues to dominate this growing field of research. 
According to EFPIA (2004), the US represents 73 .9% of 
biological R&D today, followed by Europe at 22.7%. 
The dominance of the US and Europe in creating innovative 
drugs has continued since 1990, however, there has been a 
movement toward more of the innovations coming from the 
US. P.E. Barral (2004) focuses on new drugs authorized in at 
least four of the major world markets and shows the four 
European originator countries accounted for 61 new drugs 
produced between 1975-1979, compared to 54 for the US. By 
1990-1994, European firms were the originator of 38 new 
drugs relative to the US's 40 (Barral 2004). Of the top ten 
selling drugs in the world today, US firms developed eight of 
them (Phrrna Profile 2002). 
Despite the growing evidence of the tremendous benefits of 
innovative drugs, great attention is drawn to their costs by 
consumers and governments; the pharmaceutical industry has 
come under increasing pressure to curb prices of ethical 
drugs. Between 1981-1994 drug prices rose an average of 
9.6% annually compared to 5.1 % average inflation (Santerre 
and Neun 2000). The USA Today reported findings from an 
AA.RP study indicating a 27.4% average price increase in the 
leading 155 selling drugs from 1999-2003 relative to 10.4% 
general inflation (Welch 2004). 
To bring a drug to market today, it takes approximately ten to 
fifteen years and $1.7 billion in R&D costs (Launders 2003), 
as compared to $231 million in 1987 (DiMasi et al 1991 ). 
Along with the significant financial outlay needed to create a 
new product also come the high risk of failure. Most 
compounds and biologics investigated for therapeutic use 
never make it to market. Of every 5,000 possible medicines 
investigated, five make it through to clinical trials and one 
becomes a marketable product generating revenues 
exceeding average R&D costs (PhRMA 2000). Finns engage 
in new drug development, but they need sufficient economic 
returns to continue the process. 
Pharmaceutical price and/or profit regulations have been 
implemented in all OECD countries, except the US, to 
attempt to control pharmaceutical expenditures. In Germany, 
increased price regulations were implemented in 1992 
through the Health Sector Act. By restricting prices, profits 
were diminished and companies saw much less incentive to 
conduct R&D in Germany. From 1992-1999, 23,000 jobs 
were eliminated in the German pharmaceutical industry, and 
by 2001 Germany had slipped from the number one to the 
number three position in European countries conducting 
innovative R&D (Kermani and Bonacossa 2003). The UK 
implemented profit restrictions, though they are not seen as 
restrictive as the German scheme (Kermani and Bonacossa 
2003). R&D activity has not been as gravely affected in the 
UK compared to Germany. 
Japan's government sets prices of new drugs based on older 
comparator drugs. Recently, price premiums have been 
permitted on truly innovative drugs, but even with the 
premium in place the introductory price is not higher than 
that of older drugs. Following a drug launch, the government 
decreases the price as the product matures; the highest price 
ever received is the first one. Prices fall by as much as two 
thirds from the original price within ten years. The low 
introductory prices, coupled with no inflationary price 
increases, discourage new product development (Phrrna 
2005). 
The United States is the least regulated market in the 
industrialized world, and has seen R&D increase 
significantly. EFPIA reports that in 1990, Europe led the 
United States in R&D spending by more than 70%, whereas 
today R&D in the United Stats is greater than that in Europe 
(EFPIA 2002 in Kermani and Bonacossa, 2003). We contend 
that as countries increase the stringency of the their price 
regulations, companies will either move their R&D processes 
into less regulated markets, or move out of innovative R&D. 
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In this paper we will provide insight into the factors leading 
to innovative drug production in the US . We also examine 
the impact of regulation on innovation in the world 
pharmaceutical market by comparing the US and Japan. 
Specifically, have the more restrictive drug regulations in 
Japan altered the innovation playing field and led to less 
innovation in Japan compared to the US? 
INNOVATION 
R&D in the pharmaceutical industry is the process by which 
innovative firms discover, test, and receive approval for 
ethical drugs. There are two main categories in which R&D 
falls; innovative and imitative. Imitative R&D primarily 
produces generics, me-too drugs, and line extensions. 
Therefore, it is the cheaper and "safer" form of R&D, but 
provides only incremental benefit to society. In contrast, 
innovative R&D produces novel products such as New 
Molecular Entities (NMEs) or New Chemical Entities 
(NCEs), which are one in the same. They are defined as, "any 
medication containing an active substance that has never 
before been approved for marketing in any form ... Thus, new 
dosage forms, strengths, or indications of already approved 
drugs are not considered NMEs or NCEs." (CDER 2004). 
While generics, me-too drugs, and line extensions play 
important roles, innovative products represent the largest 
benefits for society and absorb the greatest portion of R&D. 
efforts and expenditures. Thus, current trends in various 
stages in the novel R&D process can be used as metrics for 
innovation. 
How to measure the output associated with R&D inputs is a 
subject of debate. Some use NME's or NCE's, suggesting 
these are ultimately the end product. One can also argue 
NCEs first in a therapeutic class is a better measure of output. 
Similarly, how many people are impacted by the NCE is also 
a viable measure. Traditionally, however, NMEs are used as 
a broad measure ofR&D output. 
In recent years, the productivity of R&D has become ·a 
concern. In Figure 1, US R&D expenditures per year are 
compared to number of NMEs entering the US market per 
year. While total R&D has risen every year since 1980, the 
number of NMEs launched per year has oscillated downw:nd 
since 1996. For example, the number of NMEs in the US 
declined from 35 in 1999 to 21 in 2003. 
In a recent report requested of the European Commission, 
Charles River Associates (CRA 2004) contends there is not a 
global crisis in innovative R&D. By analyzing historical 
swings in launches per year and tracking the movement 
between the different phases of development until a New 
Drug Application (NDA) is filed, CRA predicts 
authorizations are likely to grow in 2005 (CRA 2004). 
NDAs are submitted to the regulatory board of a country at 
the end of Phase III in the R&D process. The regulatory 
board reviews the application to ensure all safety and efficacy 
requirements are met. If the drug is found to meet all 
requirements it is given marketing approval (PhRMA 2001). 
Therefore increases in submissions should generate an 
increase in approvals. CRA (2004) believes the downturn in 
launches due to fewer approvals was brought on by changes 
in the market rather than decreases in innovation. They 
suggest that by streamlining the regulatory process, providing 
standardized exclusivity, and allowing for faster market 
access, the number of drugs launched per year should 
increase (CRA 2004) . 
While CRA (2004) did not find there was a cns1s in 
innovation, they did find there is a disproportionate amount 
of new products, especially biologics, coming from the US 
versus the EU and Japan. New biologic entities (NBEs) use 
biotechnology to produce a new drug. The process is 
described by Scriabine (1999) as, "genes that can generate 
the potential products are discovered, cloned, and introduced 
into bacteria, yeast, or mammalian cells capable of producing 
the desired products in large quantities." As noted earlier, the 
US gained an early advantage over the EU due to better the 
patent protection and continues to attract relatively more 
resources to the biopharmaceutical arena. 
New Active Substances (NASs) include NMEs and NBEs 
and serve as another metric for drug innovation. The origins 
of the companies producing NASs first launched in the world 
have shifted towards the US since 1980. According to Figure 
2, NASs originating in US companies have increased from 
5% between 1980-83 to 47% for 2000-03 (HHS 2004). Since 
1994 the shift toward the US is dramatic. While this speaks 
positively for the R&D output in the United States, it is also 
noted that the total number of NASs produced per 4 year 
period has been slowly decreasing since 1987, again raising 
concerns about the productivity of the R&D dollars. 
THE R&D PROCESS 
In the R&D process, patents are sought even before a 
possible drug has entered clinical trials. When a firm 
determines a compound is likely to create a desired effect, the 
researching company seeks patents for a range of indications 
that the compound could possibly treat. It is essential that 
firms patent any innovation directly upon discovery so as to 
protect their investments in R&D on this compound, despite 
the fact that this limits the patent life remaining on a product 
at market launch. Once patents are granted, firms proceed 
with the R&D process by checking for the safety, toxicity, 
and metabolism of the compound through tests on animal 
subjects. If a drug is determined to have no severe side 
effects that could lead to complications in humans, the 
sponsor submits an Investigational New Drug (IND) 
application. If approved, the IND application gives sponsors 
the ability to proceed with clinical trials. 
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Clinical trials consist of three phases. Phase I is conducted on 
healthy volunteers to determine safety and dosage. In phase 
II, people with the given indication take the drug to test for 
efficacy and side effects. At the end of this phase, the sponsor 
meets with the regulatory board, the Food and Drug 
Administration in the US, to show data and receive clearance 
for end phase trials . Phase III trials use volunteers with the 
condition to test for long-term side effects. Upon completion 
of Phase III a sponsor compiles all their findings and submits 
a New Drug Application (NDA) referred to as Phase IV. If 
the drug is found to meet all regulatory board requirements it 
is given marketing approval. 
The safety and efficacy standards firms must meet to receive 
regulatory approval are high. The trend of growing efficacy 
and safety burden-of-proof standards began following the 
Thalidomide tragedy in the late 1950s. When Thalidomide 
was found to cause birth defects, the public demanded more 
care be taken in determining whether or not a product was 
safe to market. The FDA increased regulatory stringencies to 
ensure safety in 1962, but the greater safety measures 
severely affected the launch of products within the US. The 
number of new drugs introduced in the United States fell 
70% that year. The new regulations also increased the 
amount of time invested in R&D, thereby delaying 
submission of NDAs and shortening nominal patent life. 
Furthermore, fewer compounds made it through clinical trials 
and into the market. All these factors led to the US lagging 
behind France, Germany, and the UK in new drug 
introductions by 1.0, 1.6, and 2. 1 years respectively 
(Achilad:-:lis 1999). By 1970, US companies had begun to 
launch up to 60% of their products in Europe prior to 
launching in the US , thereby circumventing the burden of 
FDA approval. In the mid-1980s, Europe began to implement 
regulatory policies similar to those of the US, and thus US 
company first launches in Europe declined to between 20-
25% (Achiladelis, 1999). 
In Europe, the effects of increased efficacy standards in the 
mid-1980s were compounded by the fact that each country 
had its own regulatory board. The FDA represents the United 
States, and thus a major portion of the world pharmaceutical 
market. However, in Europe, each country had its own board 
and therefore its own efficacy standards. The creation of the 
European Agency for the Evaluation of Medical Products 
(EMEA) was an attempt by the European community to 
harmonize its regulatory process and thereby allow 
manufacturers to have better access to the market. While this 
organization attempts to harmonize the European community, 
many national and local regulatory boards still exist 
throughout European countries (Kermani and Bonacossa, 
2003). 
Today, regulatory boards are now calling on companies to 
conduct more studies than before and requiring post-market 
commitments. Post-marketing commitments are clinical trials 
mandated by the regulatory board in order for a particular 
drug to be approved temporarily with final approval subject 
to the results of the additional trials. The industry believes the 
new standards are often times unrealistic and even 
unachievable (Ruffolo, 2003). Today, this practice has 
become so wide spread that it accounts for 26 percent of 
clinical R&D out-of-pocket spending (Ruffolo, 2003). In 
2003, Tufts Center for the Study of Drug Development 
(CSDD) increased its R&D cost per drug estimate from $802 
million, as stated in 200 1, to $897 million in 2003 to include 
the cost of post-approval studies (Tufts 2003). 
Not only do supplementary trials cost a great deal, they also 
delay the market launch of drugs, which in turn hurts 
patients. Japan is best known for its supplementary trial 
demands. The country often refuses to accept trials conducted 
outside its borders, arguing Japanese bodies are intrinsically 
different from other races. While there may be some 
biological differences, most firms believe that the demands of 
the Japanese regulatory board are unreasonable. Thus, it is 
likely that many international firms will stop seeking 
regulatory approval in Japan (Ruffolo, 2003). Despite the fact 
the innovative pharmaceutical industry lies primarily in only 
three markets, the US, EU, and Japan, they lack harmonized 
systems of approval. Thus companies are forced to do at least 
three different types of clinical trials, effectively tripling 
clinical expenditures. 
Japan's regulatory process is burdensome. Four consultations 
with the Ministry of Health are required during the approval 
process. Due to severe understaffing, the appointments are 
made several months in advance. In the event a meeting 
needs to be rescheduled because clinical trial data are not yet 
available, a six month delay occurs. Moreover, since 
Japanese doctors are not paid to undertake clinical trials, 
because hospitals receive payment, it is increasingly difficult 
to find consenting doctors. These actions further limit the 
incentives to do R&D in Japan (O'Neill 2005). 
With the increased number of clinical trials required, there 
has been an increase in the cost of conducting clinical trials. 
In the last ten years the cost of conducting clinical trials has 
increased five-fold and the cost of preclinical development 
has increased 60 percent (CRA 2004). As the complexity of 
products grows, so do the complexity of trials needed to 
prove safety and efficacy. R&D today is concentrated on 
complicated, chronic diseases, in which it is harder to create 
a successful drug. The industry has already developed 
treatments and cures for most infectious diseases, and 
therefore they are now burning science and money on harder 
to treat indications (Ghosh 2003). The CRA (2004) finds 
there is clear evidence that the cost of R&D varies across 
therapeutic categories, therefore R&D costs are driven up as 
the industry moves into working on more complicated 
diseases. 
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EFFECTS OF PRICE REGULATION ON R&D 
One can think of R&D as a pay-as-you-go process. Years of 
R&D expense are incurred prior to a drug's launch, yet these 
expenses are paid for with funds generated through current 
sales, retained earnings or investor monies. Thus, current 
funds pay for current research that may not come to fruition 
in terms of a NDA for many years to come. After FDA 
approval is given and the new drug is marketed, these 
receipts can be used to support new research endeavors. 
Whether or not the receipts over the coming years are great 
enough to cover or "recoup" the already expensed R&D has 
two implications. First, it is immaterial if the R&D costs are 
recouped because the costs have already been paid. The 
second, however, is more important. If receipts earned are 
less than what it cost to create the drug, management of the 
firm and the firm ' s investors will be displeased with losing 
the gamble and question current R&D decisions. With 
hindsight, the drug was a bad investment. In addition, there 
will be less than anticipated revenues available to generate 
newR&D. 
Introducing price regulations hinders R&D. Take the 
hypothetical situation of a company. In year zero, the 
company has entities A through Z that could possibly create 
new drugs. Due to budgetary constraints and projected 
internal rates of return only six entities are selected for 
further exploration. Suppose in the fifth year of the R&D 
process, the country in which this company is conducting 
research implements unexpected price regulations, which 
effectively cut possible returns in half As a result, two 
products are dropped from the R&D process, as they will no 
longer witness returns great enough to warrant further 
investigation. At year ten, when the remaining four products 
should have completed the R&D process, only three come to 
market assuming one has failed to meet efficacy and safety 
standards. Due to the decreased cash flow brought on by 
fewer marketed drugs, the new budget constraint only allows 
for three new entities to enter the R&D pipeline in year 10 
instead of six as had been previously investigated in year 
zero. Perhaps two will make it to the market. Thus the effects 
of price controls are two-fold: an immediate decreases in 
R&D as prospective drugs witness diminished returns and 
long term declines as smaller returns facilitate less R&D. 
However, pharmaceutical companies are likely to change 
their R&D process in certain ways to accommodate 
regulation, rather then allow R&D to dry up completely. 
They may respond by increasing the creation of imitative 
drugs, by moving their research and development processes 
to less regulated markets, or they may merge with or acquire 
other pharmaceutical and biotechnology firms. 
In fact, there have been a significant number of "mega 
mergers" between companies. Firms are finding that under 
the increased pressure of R&D costs and the transition in the 
types of drugs being investigated, they can no longer be 
competitive alone. Merging with another firm provides an 
opportunity to gain more capital with which to investigate 
new drugs, as well as more possible compounds to 
investigate. For example, the company known today as 
GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) was originally 9 smaller frrms that 
combined into three firms, and now into one. Bristol-Myers 
Squibb was originally six other companies that combined to 
become four companies, and today represent only one. 
Wyeth is a combination of nineteen companies (Ruffolo, 
2003). The mergers of GSK, Bristol-Myers Squibb, Pfizer, 
Aventis, and Wyeth have occurred in only the past 20 years. 
Originally representing 42 different firms , today there are 
only five. Ruffolo estimates that it takes at least 8 significant 
pharmaceutical firms to create one company that is 
competitive in today's market. That is an 88% decrease in the 
size of the pharmaceutical industry within the last 20 years 
(Ruffolo 2003). He attributes this collapse to the increase in 
R&D time and costs as well as declining success rates. 
Price regulation of a country' s pharmaceutical market not 
only affects that country, but the world as a whole. This is 
true because the revenues from one country directly affect the 
revenues for multinational research-based pharmaceutical 
companies. International price comparisons and parallel trade 
are the primary sources of regulatory spillover; many 
regulatory systems use price referencing as a benchmark for 
reimbursement prices. Reference pricing occurs when a 
country gathers price data from other countries to create 
comparative price analyses, allowing payers to set a 
reimbursement ceiling (O'Neill, 2003). Generally, lower 
prices from counties with highly price sensitive or highly 
regulated markets are being used as a benchmark, creating 
artificially low prices in the country using the reference 
pricing. These artificially low prices, especially prevalent in 
Japan, decrease the ability of pharmaceutical firms to earn 
sufficient revenues to maintain existing R&D projects. 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
In an older study, Jensen (1987) analyzed the effects of US 
safety and efficacy regulation stringency on pharmaceutical 
R&D. Her findings supported other studies which found the 
1962 Amendments to the FDA guidelines for both efficacy 
and safety did have negative, significant effects on the 
number of new drugs being developed. She found , "the 
magnitude of this effect appears to be large: a one month 
decrease in each of the two regulatory delay variables would 
lead to an increase of approximately 15% in the number of 
NCEs discovered per year, ceteris paribus" (Jensen, 1987). 
Troyer and Krasnikov (2002) use 1970-2000 data for US 
NCEs, New Drug Applications and New Drug Approvals to 
show how changes in FDA policies affected the three 
innovation measures. They find R&D expenditures and sales 
are highly correlated, thus they use changes in sales rather 
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than changes in R&D to predict changes in innovations. A 
one percent increase in sales growth currently and lagged one 
year accounts for a 2.65% in the growth of New Drug 
Applications, compared to a 2.89% increase in New Drugs 
Approved. The number approved was positively impacted in 
1984 and 1992, following the FDA's extension in patent 
protection and shortened review times, respectively. 
Limiting sales growth via price regulation in the US would 
reduce pharmaceutical innovation (Troyner and Krasnikov 
2002). 
According to research conducted by Grabowski (1986) there 
are three structural factors that determine research 
expenditure: research productivity, product diversification, 
and the level of internally generated funds. These results are 
reiterated by Achilladelis and Antonakis (2001) showing 
annual R&D expenditures for ten global firms for 1950-1989 
are determined by past R&D and cash flow. Grabowski's 
indicators predict a change in the hub of R&D as increased 
regulation occurs in one region relative to another. As 
European countries have increased their regulations on 
pharmaceuticals, manufacturers no longer see a promising 
future nor do they have sufficient retained earnings to 
encourage R&D investment. As a result, the R&D that once 
took place in these countries is predicted to decrease. The 
evidence of the 1990's supports this contention. By 1999, 
R&D investment within Europe was down 73% from 1990 . 
while the R&D industry in the United States grew from a $1 
billion industry in 1970 to a $32 billion industry by 2002 
(Pharmaceutical Industry Profile, 2003). 
Pammolli et al (2000) did an extensive study of the EU 
pharmaceutical industry to see if the European industry is 
falling behind that of the US. They find the EU firms have a 
comparative disadvantage in selling their innovative 
products, citing the number of NCEs created by US versus 
EU finns since 1990 is not much different, but the US sales 
of such are twice as high. They contend market demand for 
drugs grew demonstrably in the US, and that despite the 
multinational nature of the companies, firms still tend to 
concentrate sales in their home market. This advantaged the 
US firms, and subsequently several EU firms did move some 
R&D and sales efforts to the US. Since 2000, British 
GlaxoSmithKline, Swiss Novartis, Dutch Organon and 
German Schering AG have moved substantial parts of their 
businesses to the US. Additionally, Pammolli et al contend 
the US has witnessed more vertical consolidation of R&D 
efforts by firms, which coupled with the numerous biotech 
upstarts, have created an R&D advantage in the US over the 
EU (Pammolli et al 2000). One can infer the market demand 
comes from the relatively unregulated nature of the US 
market compared to the attempt to pare prices in the EU. 
Maclnnes et al ( 1993) conducted an international study of 
drug utilization in the international pharmaceutical industry. 
They studied NCEs and NBEs launched in the US, Europe, 
and Japan from 1970-1992. They found Europe was initially 
responsible for introducing the most NCEs, but the data from 
1990 to 1992 led them to believe this trend would not 
continue. They argue the decrease in European 
competitiveness can be linked to increasing price pressures 
being born by innovative firms. With sales and margins 
declining, companies are unable to earn sufficient monies to 
reinvest in R&D and therefore were forced to cut their 
budgets (Maclnnes et al, 1993). 
Scherer (2001) finds the US pharmaceutical industry is best 
represented as a virtuous rent-seeking industry. Using 
industry data from 1962-1996, he finds firms use profits to 
create additional R&D ventures, which in turn increase R&D 
costs until all supra-normal profits dissipate. Therefore 
attempts to reduce prices and profits will have deleterious 
impacts on future R&D. 
As part of the Medicare Prescription Drug Act of 2003, 
Congress requested a study be undertaken, directed by the 
Commerce Department, to examine the effects of 
pharmaceutical price deregulation on R&D and innovation. 
In December 2004, the presented report stated estimated 
increases in revenues between $17 .6-$26.7 billion annually, 
following price deregulation. The higher revenues are 
expected to increase R&D by $5.3-$8 billion annually, 
resulting in an average of 2.7-4.1 new drugs each year 
(Congress 2003). Once again, price regulations are seen as a 
detriment to innovation. 
MODELS AND DATA 
We investigate econometrically two interrelated phenomena. 
First, we posit R&D employees and domestic sales create 
innovative drugs, though with a lag. Second, price 
regulations hinder the number of new drugs coming to 
market; countries with drug price regulations will witness 
less innovative activity since the regulations reduce the 
returns to inventiveness. While those claims are not 
surprising, the difficulty in testing them lies in the 
availability of data. Ideally, we would like the dependent 
variable to be the number of first launches of innovative 
drugs (no me-too drugs) in the world per year based on the 
drug company's country of origin. For example, if fifteen 
new drugs appeared on the world market in 2004, regardless 
of where they first appeared, we would like to know how 
many of the drugs emanated from US firms, British firms, 
Japanese firms, etc. We predict the number of new drugs 
emanating from a country is directly related to R&D 
employment and domestic sales in the country. 
Domestic sales are an independent variable for three reasons. 
First, firms will seek to create and market drugs where the 
expected return is greatest. Since industry data on net profits 
are not available, the proxy of sales is used. Second, using 
domestic sales, as opposed to total sales that include foreign 
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sales, suggests home country sales serve as the drawing card 
for innovation as suggested by Pammolli et al (2000). Third, 
R&D expenditures are needed to develop a drug and for post-
marketing clinical trials. These pay-as-you-go R&D 
expenditures require sufficient sales, and domestic sales can 
provide the funding . Additionally, since R&D expenditures 
are highly correlated with R&D employment, the other 
independent variable, domestic sales serve as the proxy for 
R&D expenditures as proffered by Troyer and Krasnikov 
(2002). 
R&D personnel are hired to create new drugs and get them 
approved. Though there is approximately a fifteen year time 
lag between pre-clinical research and new drug approval, 
there is a flurry of R&D activity required at Stage III trials. 
According to Phrma (2003), 35% of R&D researchers are 
involved in the basic, pre-clinical processes. The remainder, 
which account for 68% of the R&D expenditures, are 
involved in the drugs ' approval stages. In fact, 23% of the 
R&D staff are involved at Stage III, which occurs about two 
years prior to approval. For these reasons we expect lagged 
R&D employment to predict new approvals. 
Unfortunately, we are not privy to the data for the dependent 
variable. We use a suitable alternative measure of 
innovativeness: NCEs approved per year in each country. 
Our dependent variable is a reasonable alternative to our 
desired one for two reasons: the majority of the drugs 
introduced in a market originate from home country firms; 
and new drugs corning from foreign firms require some R&D 
activity in the approval country in order to pass regulatory 
muster. We use NCEs approved only, not biologics or 
vaccines, for two reasons. First, we are wary of not having 
corresponding R&D figures for the biotech firms. Second, 
for comparison purposes, the data from Japan only include 
NCEs. 
The national trade associations of the major markets survey 
member firms annually and publish R&D employment and 
sales. In the US, Phrma has surveyed its members since 
1968. The R&D figures represent 80% of the pharmaceutical 
and biopharmaceutical industry' s R&D expendirilres in 2004 
(Profile 2005), though it was a higher percentage prior to the 
increase in biotech products. Unfortunately, R&D 
employment and expenditure figures are not available for the 
numerous small biotech firms that are not members of 
Phrma, which is why we concentrate on NCEs only, since 
they derive from pharmaceutical companies. JPMA conducts 
R&D surveys of firms operating in Japan and data are 
available from 1980. VFA is the German trade association 
conducting surveys, but the data begin in 1990. British, 
Swiss and French data are available for too few years, thus 
are not included. Lastly, we need data to span as many years 
as possible to incorporate trends. 
Concentrating on the US market for 1980-2004, we expect 
more NCEs approved in the US over time as R&D 
employment in the US increases and as domestic sales rise. 
We use a multiple regression model (1) to estimate this 
relationship: 
m m 
NCEt= BO + I Bt-j*RDEMPj +I Bt-j *DSALESj+ 
j=O j=O 
B3 *TIME +B4*FDA+ i::t (1) 
NCEt is the number of NCE' s approved in year tin the US. 
RDEMPj represents R&D employment in the US 
pharmaceutical industry and we allow for lags (j ) in 
employment to impact innovation. DSALESj is US domestic 
sales, which also allows for lagging. The Prescription Drug 
User Fee Act (PDUFA) passed in 1992 led to a demonstrable 
increase in NCEs in 1996, thus FDA is a binary variable for 
1996. TIME represents time intervals 1, 2 . .. and its inclusion 
is addressed below. 
R&D employment in the US generally increases each year as 
shown in Figure 2. NCEs approved each year in the US 
oscillate as shown in Figure 2, suggesting the time sensitive 
nature of NCEs, R&D employment, and domestic sales may 
lead to spurious results when estimating (1). 
The second model we estimate uses NCEs approved each 
year in the US and Japan with the corresponding R&D 
employment for each country each year. We cannot include 
the other price regulating countries at this time due to 
insufficient data. We test whether Japan has fewer predicted 
NCEs given the regulated nature of its market relative to the 
US by including a binary variable JAPAN. We estimate 
m 
NCEit= BO + I Bt-j*RDEMPij + B2*TIME + B3TIME2+ 
j=O 
B4*JAPAN+i::t (2) 
where NCEit represents NCEs in each country i per year t. 
R&D employment in country I in period t is RDEMPit. To 
capture the quadratic shape of the NCEs, TIME and TIME 
. squared are used. Domestic sales are only available for 
twelve years in Japan, thus we exclude them as an 
independent variable. 
We have a complete data set for RDEMP, DSALES and 
NCEs for the US for 1980-2003. The NCEs only include 
innovative drug approvals, not me-too drugs. The RDEMP 
captures Phrma membership R&D employees in the US , 
which includes R&D employees working for foreign-based 
firms operating in the US and in Phrma's membership. 
JPMA reports two sets of NCEs each year, one entitled 
' manufactured' the other 'imported'. The first is NCEs 
approved to firms manufacturing in Japan and the second 
represents drugs approved for import. We use the former 
since they are most closely related to Japanese R&D 
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employment in Japan. Japanese data are available from 
1980-2002. Unfortunately our results are limited by small 
sample sizes. 
US MARKET RESULTS 
Estimating the US equation (1) may lead to spurious results 
given the time sensitive nature of the variables. Each time 
series variable is tested for unit roots using Ender' s procedure 
(Enders, 1995). The Augmented Dickey Fuller test suggests 
NCEs, RDEMP and DSALES have unit roots. The same 
holds for the natural logs of R&D employment and domestic 
sales, LNRDEMP and LNDSALES, respectively. The first 
differences are stationary as shown in Table I. 
Various lag structures were estimated using one and two 
period lags. The most robust results appear in (3). All p-
values are given in parentheses. 
/\ 




ADJ-R2=.39 A NCE mean = .136 DW=2.117 
The model captures 39% of the variation in the change in 
NCEs from one year to the next. Equation (3) suggests a 1 % 
increase in the growth of R&D employment in year t 
accelerates NCE creation by 51, which is enormous relative 
to the annual mean change in NCEs of .136. R&D. efforts 
take time and the payoff is great two years hence, which is 
not surprising given the influx of R&D activity at Stage III . 
The coefficient on FDA implies the PDUF A impact was an 
acceleration of almost 30 NCEs in 1996, which is consistent 
with the jump from 28 to 53 between 1995 and 1996. The 
coefficient on ALNSALES is not statistically significant. In 
alternative estimations, time, foreign sales and total sales 
were included, but none were significant .. 
Replacing ARDEMP for ALNRDEMP yields equation (4): 
/\ 
ANCE1 = -7.09 + 29.15*FDA + .000878 *ARDEMP1_2 + 
(.0010) (.0767) 
35.67*ALNDSALES1· (4) 
(.3525) ADJ-R2=.40 A NCE mean= .136 DW=2.l l6 
The results are very similar. The estimation implies a 1000 
person change in R&D employment in year t accelerates 
NCEs by .878 two years later. This suggests a 1,140 person 
increase in R&D employment now accelerates the NCEs by 
one, two years from now. Witnessing the incredible increase 
from 51,588 to 77,459 R&D employees between 2000 and 
2003 in the US suggests a rapid acceleration of NCEs 
approved in the US in the near future. 
Regressing levels on levels from (1) is feasible if the 
variables are cointegrated and leads to non-spurious results. 
Equation (5)'s Tau to test for cointegration is -3.86, which is 
significant at .0 1, implying non-spurious results. Using the 
runs test to test for serial correlation from the residuals in (5) 
enable us to reject serial correlation. 
/\ 






The results suggest approximately 2,380 additional R&D 
employees in year twill increase NCE's by one in year t+2. 
An influx of R&D personnel into the US will reap innovative 
rewards. Domestic sales do not statistically significantly 
impact NCE's, contrary to Troyner and Krasnikov (2002). 
US VS. JAPAN RESULTS 
The second set of regression results concern price 
regulations. Until more data are available for the UK, 
Germany, Switzerland and France, the only comparison is 
between the US and Japan. Since total sales figures are 
limited for Japan, and domestic sales figures are not included 
as an independent variable. Equation ( 6) presents the 
estimated results from (2) using the Yule-Walker technique 
for correcting for autocorrelation. The Tau of-6.29 for the 
cointegration test for (6) suggests non-spurious results. 
/\ 
NCI;= 11.23 + .6372*TIME + -.0449*TIME2 + 
(.5061) (.1623) 
.0003*RDEMP1_2 + -7.44*JAPAN 
(.1051) (.0741) 
ADJ-R2=.439 DW= l.88 (6) 
Time and time squared are included to account for the 
quadratic nature of NCEs in both countries. The signs on 
these coefficients are as expected, but not statistically 
significant. The coefficient on R&D employment lagged two 
years implies an additional 1,000 people will increase NCEs 
by .3 two years later. Alternatively, 3,333 additional 
personnel will create one more NCE, ceteris paribus. The 
number ofNCEs being approved in Japan is 7.5 less than that 
in the US , holding time trends and R&D employment 
constant. The regulations in Japan lead to fewer innovations, 
regardless ofR&D employment. 
CONCLUSION 
R&D employment is a key factor in determining drug 
innovation. In the US , adding 2,380 R&D employees will 
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increase NCEs two years later by one on average. This 
positive impact also holds across the US and Japan. The 
regulations in Japan create an environment not conducive to 
innovation; about 7.5 fewer NCEs on average are approved 
in Japan compared to the US. If Japanese firms begin to shift 
R&D into the US, there will be a double impact on the 
reduction of NCEs approved in Japan. This bodes poorly for 
the Japanese drug industry. 
There are several avenues available for future research. First, 
collecting additional data on EU countries would enable a 
more robust study. We are attempting to collect these data. 
Second, finding the most recent data will not only elongate 
the sample size but will show the most recent trends. As 
soon as new US and Japanese data are available, the 
equations will be re-estimated. Third, capturing Japanese 
domestic sales data may enhance the US versus Japanese 
model. Fourth, trying to incorporate biologics and R&D 
employment in biologics may be feasible if data can be 
found. The shift to biologics, especially in the US, needs to 
be examined. Lastly, · finding the more ideal dependent 
variable may be possible, which would cast a new and 
perhaps better light on drug innovation. 
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